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CONSTITUTIONS AND BLOCKCHAINS: COMPETITIVE
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Eric Alston*†

In the context of private ordering—where rule sets are relatively fluid, centrally
controlled, and exist in the shadow of law and regulation—developing
generalizable insights about comparatively superior governance mechanisms is
difficult. I shed light on this question by characterizing cryptocurrency blockchains
as a type of constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the activities
supported by the underlying distributed ledger technology. More specifically, I
argue that cryptocurrency blockchains have led to new forms of competition in
private governance, which include exit costs and citizenship rules as important
competitive margins. My analysis not only identifies the choices in constitutional
governance to which proposed cryptocurrency blockchain changes are analogous,
but it also highlights the competitive gains expected to result from these changes. I
further consider both the trade-offs in governance created by competition between
cryptocurrency blockchains and the surprising ways in which these unique
competitive margins may influence downstream outcomes.
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Sets

I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutions are the most famous example of what legal scholars refer to
as secondary rules. More colloquially, secondary rules are the rules about making
rules.1
In the case of constitutions, these rule sets determine how laws are enacted,
administered, and adjudicated in a given society. Constitutional rules are thus
accorded a high level of importance in a given nation’s legal system because they
are quite literally the foundation upon which all subsequent legislation and
government action rest. Because of constitutional rules’ fundamental nature, these
rules are by design less subject to change than ordinary legislation. In other words,
constitutional rules are typically the most rigid rule set in a given legal system.
Nonetheless, constitutions vary as to the means and ease by which they can be
amended. Thus, the comparative flexibility of a given constitution is an institutional
design choice that has long been treated in the scholarship on comparative
constitutional design, which has linked flexibility both to endurance and to a
diminished need for informal measures of constitutional adjustment.
Where there is a distinct understanding of the fundamental rules governing
human interactions—perhaps because of the lack of a uniform standard of
comparison and public availability of underlying policies—is in the context of
private governance. This may be in part because one of the benefits of a firm
structure is that decisions regarding policy change are typically validated through a
centralized process, as opposed to a democratic one, which inherently creates less
need for “governance of governance” in that the “law” is whatever the central firm
authority says it is. From an economic perspective, the firm provides the
quintessential example of private governance. Previous scholars such as Coase and
Williamson have demonstrated how governance within the firm is an essential field
of study for understanding economic outcomes.2 The ubiquity of the firm as an
organizational structure governing economic production has a corollary
implication: the choice of private institutions by various firms provides a margin
for competition. However, the extent to which firms can freely compete in terms of
internal governance and the agreements struck with different employees and
suppliers is an open question in a world of increased legislation and regulation of
contractual agreements, especially in the case of publicly-traded companies.
1

See generally Lɪᴏɴᴇʟ Aᴅᴏʟᴘʜᴜꜱ Hᴀʀᴛ & Lᴇꜱʟɪᴇ Gʀᴇᴇɴ, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2012).
See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386–405 (1937); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract, 16 JOURNAL OF
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 172–95 (2002).
2
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In a world of regulated and centralized firms, how do scholars derive
insights about the comparative benefits of different choices in private governance?
The emergence of blockchains as the technology underlying cryptocurrencies
provides a fruitful context in which to examine this question. The example of the
different tensions faced by Ether and Bitcoin, and the different responses in terms
of changes to the fundamental underlying structure of the blockchains supporting
the two cryptocurrencies, suggests value in comparing how different mechanisms
of blockchain governance result in different outcomes for cryptocurrencies and
their intended functions. Using insights from constitutional design generally, and
amendment processes specifically, I explore the differences in blockchain
governance mechanisms in this article. I conclude that blockchains can be
understood as a type of constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the
activities supported by permissionless distributed ledger technology.3 In particular,
the exit costs and amendment processes defined by the “constitutional” regimes
that blockchains define create a unique competitive margin that will shape the
comparative success of a given cryptocurrency.
I proceed by first reviewing the existing scholarship on constitutional
processes and by identifying how ubiquitous constitutional design features
(amendment rules, rule entrenchment, and citizenship provisions) can each play a
role in facilitating the objectives of those engaged in a rule-based collective
decision-making process like those governed by permissionless blockchains. I then
provide a brief description of the blockchains supporting major cryptocurrencies,
identifying the ways in which the underlying network rules are similar to and
distinct from constitutional rules. Next, I compare existing and proposed
governance structures for blockchains, especially those supporting the
cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ether, but also other permissionless use cases. My
analysis identifies not only the choices in constitutional governance to which
proposed blockchain changes are analogous but also the competitive benefits and
costs that result, with a view to the intended functions of a given blockchain.
Finally, I consider the trade-offs in governance that competition between
cryptocurrency blockchains creates, examining how these unique competitive
margins can influence downstream outcomes, and predicting that membership
rules, rule entrenchment, and amendment processes will become increasingly
salient governance choices.
3

Other scholars have contemporaneously drawn related comparisons to mine. See, e.g., Shruti
Rajagopalan, Blockchain & Buchanan: Code As Constitution (2019) (in James Buchanan, Theorist
of Political Economy and Social Philosophy, (Palgrave MacMillan 2019); see also Alastair Berg,
Chis Novak, & Mikayla Novak, Blockchains and Constitutional Catallaxy (Dec. 4, 2018), available
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3295477 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3295477.
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: RULE ENTRENCHMENT, CITIZENSHIP, AND
AMENDMENT

The principal bulk of our behavior is not governed directly by constitutional
rules. Instead, our behavior is governed by the legislative, executive, and judicial
output of public organizations defined by these constitutional rules. It is in this
sense that “the rules about making rules” are secondary, as Hart described them.4
Our primary day-to-day activities and the majority of our disputes and prohibited
actions are governed by primary rules; secondary rules instead define the system
that writes, administers, and adjudicates the primary rules governing our behavior.
This is because there are significant benefits to agreeing to the means by which
subsequent rules will be defined and changed. If, instead, every rule change also
required a debate over the means by which the rule would be defined, creating new
rules would be much harder, if not impossible.5 Put differently, the game cannot be
played if no one agrees on the underlying rules. This is the essential argument for
the ubiquitous emergence of constitutional rule sets in governance systems around
the world.6 Within these rule sets, though, there are also more specific constitutional
design features that reduce the costs of collective decision making at scale: rule
entrenchment, citizenship (or membership) rules, and amendment processes. Both
the multi-tiered nature of constitutional rules more generally, as well as these design
features more specifically, share intended functions with blockchains that reveal
important governance tradeoffs for different cryptocurrency communities.
A.

Rule Entrenchment

The first ubiquitous constitutional design feature is that of rule
entrenchment, or insulation. The reasons for the entrenchment of rules follow
directly from the logic of secondary rules more generally. Leaving decision rules
up for grabs can greatly stymy group decision making due to the increased costs
and strategic incentives already discussed. Even if a rule is not given heightened
protection from change as compared to the ordinary decision rules in a given group,
decision-making procedures tend to limit a given meeting to a known set of topics,
4

See Hᴀʀᴛ & Gʀᴇᴇɴ, supra note 1.
A multi-tiered rule process focuses the margins of political competition on a more narrow set of
issues, once the rules of the game have been agreed upon. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, The
Relatively Absolute Absolutes, in THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 448–
50 (Liberty Fund, 1999); see also Jonathan Riley, Constitutional Democracy as a Two-Stage Game,
in CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE AND DEMOCRATIC RULE 147–50 (Cambridge University Press,
2001).
6
See Jᴀᴍᴇꜱ M. Bᴜᴄʜᴀɴᴀɴ & Gᴏʀᴅᴏɴ Tᴜʟʟᴏᴄᴋ, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 60–80 (University of
Michigan Press, 1962) (discussing why constitutional rule sets could emerge as the result of purely
self-interested decisions among constituents).
5
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in part to prevent the decision rules from being subject to opportunistic change.7
However, this specific procedural rule, limiting group decisions to the matters
defined ex-ante, raises a more general design question surrounding secondary
rules: which rules have to be defined before ordinary decision-making can proceed?
This begets the notion that some rules are properly constitutional. The rules about
making rules have to be defined before decisions about ordinary rules can be made.
However, secondary rules also necessarily empower and constrain the individuals
who make decisions on behalf of the group to ensure that decision-making follows
a known and defined process.
The fact that the secondary rules both define and constrain the individuals
uniquely empowered as compared to ordinary group members has led to the
additional institutional design choice that is nearly ubiquitous in these contexts:
insulation of secondary rules from the ordinary processes of collective decisionmaking.8 In practice, this typically takes two forms. First, changes to secondary
rules typically require a higher degree of consensus among group decision-makers
as compared to changes to ordinary rules. The canonical example of this in practice
is the requirement in political systems that constitutional amendments require a
legislative supermajority to occur.9 The second form of rule entrenchment, is the
involvement of a larger portion of the group, or a distinct subset of group members,
in such decisions.10 Clear examples of rule entrenchment from constitutional design
worldwide are the involvement of subnational units in constitutional amendments
7

See John W. Patty & Elizabeth Maggie Penn, The Legislative Calendar, 48 MATHEMATICAL AND
COMPUTER MODELLING 1590–91,1599–1600 (2008) (discussing the necessity of a general
understanding of legislative schedule setting, given its ubiquity in practice).
8
Options in practice of more less stringent amendment rules abound. If occurring via legislative
change, adjustment of the threshold required for passage is a common choice, with a higher
threshold accordingly making passage more difficult, and vice versa. Another margin defining the
difficulty of amendment involves the extent to which different stakeholders’ input is required in
order for amendment to occur; if an amendment can only occur after it has successfully passed the
legislative threshold and a popular referendum, this is more difficult than requiring either one of
those options. See Bjørn Erik Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and
Constitutional Stability, 12 DEM. CONST. DESIGN & PUB. POL’Y: ANALYSIS AND EVIDENCE 536–49
(2006) (discussing options in practice of less stringent amendment rules abound. If occurring via
legislative change, adjustment of the threshold required for passage is a common choice, with a
higher threshold accordingly making passage more difficult, and vice versa. Another margin
defining the difficulty of amendment involves the extent to which different stakeholders’ input is
required in order for amendment to occur; if an amendment can only occur after it has successfully
passed the legislative threshold and a popular referendum, this is more difficult than requiring either
one of those options).
9
See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty,13 INT’L J. CONST. L.
691 (2015).
10
See id. at 692.
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(like the role of states governments in the United States)11 or the requirement that
proposed constitutional amendments pass a public referendum before enactment.12
The formal articulation of core group principles and beliefs also frequently receive
this level of entrenchment,13 even if the entrenchment of these principles is not
strictly necessary from the functional perspective of ordinary group decisionmaking.
Instead of the inadequacy of a given constitution eventually leading to it
being overturned and replaced, a lower cost outcome is the adjustment of the
constitution to prevent outright constitutional rupture.14 This makes the exact level
of rule entrenchment an important constitutional design question.15 Because of the
relative entrenchment of constitutional rules compared to ordinary legislation,
changing them in practice tends to provide an expressive function in signaling that
a cornerstone aspect of governance is subject to potential change.16 Meaning, the
very act of amending a constitution raises the salience of the particular areas in
question (as well as inflaming “constitutional passions,” independent of the
underlying political or social questions at issue).17 The ability to amend a
fundamental charter also provides for dynamic legitimization; if those currently
governed by a given constitution can change it, then they are more likely to view
the constitution as reflecting their needs and goals surrounding governance. This
concept of the ongoing “fit” between the written constitutional document and
societal preferences surrounding governance is one that comes up against the
strength of governance preferences today, versus the need for the intertemporal
ability to adjust this fit. Which aspects, if any, of the constitution should be
insulated to the point that they are never subject to future adjustment?
11

See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8, at 326.
See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 9, at 692.
13
See Heinz Klug, Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 601 (2000).
14
See generally Richard Albert, The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 59
MCGILL L.J. 225 (2013) (discussing the corrective nature of constitutional amendment procedures
and safeguards those procedures provide); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, RESPONDING TO
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson
ed., 1995).
15
Despite many similar and identical amendment processes around the world, there is significant
variation in the extent of change that a given level of constitutional flexibility yields in practice.
This suggests that rule entrenchment, like many constitutional design questions, interacts in complex
ways with the political and social milieu within which it is enacted and implemented. See Ginsburg
& Melton, supra note 9, at 692–701.
16
See Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8, at 325–26.
17
Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional Design, 9
INT’L J. CON. L. 636, 636–72 (2011) (examining how different constitutional amendments and
methods of amending are impacted by various social and political considerations).
12
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The distinction between adherence to the letter of constitutional law, and
adherence to the ongoing societal governance beliefs that animated the creation of
the constitutional order writ large, has been well studied by constitutional scholars.
Put simply, constituents in general, and political actors in particular, are guided by
their beliefs as to what the constitution should (and should not) achieve.18 Just as
sufficiently reprehensible government action itself can trigger regime change,
sufficient change to the constitutional definition of governments (and its checks and
balances) has long been argued as capable of annihilating or eliminating the
existing constitutional order altogether.19 The justification for making some
provisions unamendable clearly spells out the distinction between the unwritten
constitutional principles that are crystallized through a constituent process into the
written constitution: “the immutability of the principles . . . marked out a normative
core that defined the constitutional identity of the polity.”20 Unamendability, as the
most extreme form of rule entrenchment, thus serves a profound expressive
function, albeit one that is fundamentally anti-democratic intertemporally in the
case of public constitutional orders.
Although unamendability provides a clear link between the formal
constitution itself and the constitutional principles animating the creation of the
written document, the existence of an underlying set of constitutional beliefs is not
limited to contexts where a subset of fundamental rules are unamendable per se.
Fundamental beliefs about blockchains’ immutability and the need to punish bad
actors stand as examples of these constitutional beliefs in the context of
cryptocurrency communities, as the discussion in section V emphasizes.
Constitutional rulesets’ supremacy has an important corollary: exiting a
national constitution’s ruleset, or in other words, revoking one’s own citizenship,
18

See NORMAN SCHOFIELD, ARCHITECTS OF POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL QUANDARIES
AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 260–62 (Stephen Ansolabehere ed., 2006); see generally Eric Alston,
Lee Alston, & Bernardo Mueller, INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS &
APPLICATIONS 273–313 (2018).
19

Carl Schmitt’s 1928 critique of the paradox created by substantively unconstrained amendment
procedures has been linked to the emergence of unamendable provisions in the German Basic Law
of 1949. See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150–51 (Jeffery Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke
University Press 2008); e.g., Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of Eternity Clauses: The German
Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 439, 439 (2011). (explaining that the emergence of the Nazi regime that
was so at odds with the core constitutional principles that gave birth to the Weimar Republic, led
drafters of the Basic Law after World War II to adopt specific provisions that the fundamental
aspects of the structure of the government could not be altered through the government’s power,
effectively getting rid of a constitutional basis for amending these elements and requiring the
wholesale replacement of Basic Law by Germans through extra-constitutional means).
20
Preuss, supra note 19, at 441.
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often imposes significant costs. Moving from state to state can allow a citizen
considerable choice as to the rules governing their behavior; the rules of the United
States Constitution, however, do not change from state to state. The higher the exit
costs, the more important the process of dynamic constitutional legitimization
discussed thus far becomes, and vice versa, because, without a viable ability to
change the rulesets that govern one’s life, the only alternative is to exit the ruleset.21
Amendment rules at least partially address this problem and create a space within
which the constitution can be changed. Constitutional amendment procedures can
range from the extreme of making the constitution unamendable to making
constitutional change subject to the same requirements as ordinary legislation. At
the extreme of unamendability, constituents would have considerable certainty as
to the finality of constitutional rules governing them at any given time, while at the
other, constituents could easily adapt the constitution to suit new circumstances and
changing beliefs surrounding governance.22 In practice, modern national
constitutions strike a balance between these two extremes. Even if the drafters
intend to lean towards unamendability, one scholar notes that the need for
constitutional amendment is so fundamental that “all constitutions admit the
possibility of amendment,”23 in great part because the option of exit is so costly for
most individuals governed by a given constitution. For most citizens of nationstates around the world, they are a member of a given constitutional order not by
choice, but by the consequence of birth.
B.

Citizenship Rules (Exit & Entry Costs)

Another key design feature in order for a secondary rule set to function in
governing a given group is that of membership: what characteristics define who is
a member of the group, and how can members leave the group (whether voluntarily
or not)? In practice, these requirements can take the form of costs imposed upon
joining or leaving the group: entry and exit costs. Entry costs are probably the most
familiar to political theorists in the form of citizenship requirements: what
conditions must be satisfied in order for a given individual to be able to participate
21

Exit costs have long been identified as a central determinant of the institutions of governance that
emerge in both public and private organizations. See Aʟʙᴇʀᴛ Hɪʀꜱᴄʜᴍᴀɴ, EXIT VOICE AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 4–7 (1970). These costs
have also been identified as important determinants of governance outcomes in the private sector;
see, e.g., Colin Mayer, Corporate Governance and Performance, 21(1) J. L & SOC’Y. 152, 156
(1997); John Coffee Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class Actions: Why Exit
Works Better Than Voice, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 409–10 (2008).
22
Sanford V. Levinson, Designing an Amendment Process, in Cᴏɴꜱᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cᴜʟᴛᴜʀᴇ ᴀɴᴅ
Dᴇᴍᴏᴄʀᴀᴛɪᴄ Rᴜʟᴇ 271, 272–274 (2001).
23
Andrew Roberts, The Politics of Constitutional Amendment in Postcommunist Europe, 20 CONST.
POL. ECON. 99, 99 (2009) (emphasis mine).

139

Constitutions and Blockchains: Competitive Governance of Fundamental Rule
Sets

in a political system with the standard rights and duties accorded to all other
citizens?24 Entry requirements can be a screen for well-justified as well as dubious
reasons: conditioning membership in a homeowners’ association on actual
homeownership verges on the tautological, whereas conditioning such membership
on race or ethnicity would rightly be broadly condemned in society today. Entry
costs can, therefore, be conditioned on reasons related to the good of the
organization itself, or for reasons unrelated to the strength or sustainability of the
organization.
Conditioning membership on a certain level of commitment or
characteristics can shape membership or members’ incentives in ways that improve
governance outcomes. If the costs are high enough to become a member, other
members can receive more assurance as to the level of desire for membership on
the part of new members. If one has made a costly investment in membership, one’s
incentives to influence governance outcomes for the better are likely stronger than
in the case of a group that it costs nothing to join.
Just as becoming a member of the organization can be more or less costly
to a given individual, so too can departing from the organization. For instance, taxes
imposed on Americans revoking their U.S. citizenship are, in part, an attempt to
condition the departure costs of high wealth citizens who may be incentivized to
relinquish citizenship in search of a cheaper tax burden elsewhere.25 The extended
process associated with changing citizenship also temporally delimits the ability of
individuals to exit – one can effectively only change citizenship after a considerable
amount of time has passed. The functional effect of such financial and temporal
exit costs is that, by making exit more costly, an organization’s members are more
likely to engage in the costly process of governance. If a given “citizen” can’t leave,
they might as well influence the rules that will govern them. Currently,
cryptocurrency community members face relatively low entry and exit costs,
something that will likely change as cryptocurrency blockchains continue to
compete on governance choices directly.

24

See Kim Rubenstein & Niamh Lenagh-Maguire, Citizenship and the Boundaries of the
Constitution, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 143, 143 (2011); see also Patrick Weil,
Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES 17, 17 (2001).
25
See William Thomas Worster, The Constitutionality of the Taxation Consequences for
Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 921, 923 (2010).
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C.

Amendment Rules

Ultimately, though, these specific constitutional design questions interact
with one another in deep structural ways. The membership trade-offs influenced by
entry and exit costs are also shaped by the choice of amendment rules: a constitution
can be comparatively more flexible or rigid, depending upon how difficult it is to
amend, which is itself a question of the extent of rule entrenchment originally
chosen by constitutional drafters.26 Amendment rules have been characterized as
necessarily corrective, recognizing the likelihood that a constitution will prove
deficient in the light of unforeseen future events. Ultimately, though, the need for
constitutional change is a function of how well initial constitutional design choices
dynamically facilitate economies of scale in governance while simultaneously
minimizing agency costs.
Beyond the most basic structural trade-off between flexibility and rigidity,
constitutional scholars have deepened the comparative understanding of choices of
amendment rules. Thus, the trade-off between flexibility and rigidity has also been
characterized as trading off between stability and flexibility;27 but this
characterization of stability is more focused on the stability of the underlying rule
set,28 as opposed to the stability of governance overall. The underlying intuition is
a simple one: a constitution that faces more barriers to adjustment is less likely to
be adaptable to changing circumstances in society, and hence, is more likely to
provoke the need for a wholesale constitutional overhaul in cases where it does not
fit the needs and beliefs surrounding governance in society. Nonetheless, too much
flexibility at some level undermines the basic principle of constitutionalism as a set
of stable limits on ordinary politics.29 Because of the complexity of these trade26

In addition to the options for rule entrenchment discussed in a preceding subsection, other
mechanisms for making a constitution more rigid or flexible exist in practice. Amendments can
require more than one successful passage, a requirement designed to increase the salience of the
issue to any stakeholders who might favor or oppose the amendment. The assent of subsidiary
authorities can also be required, as is the case with the United States; Article V of the US
Constitution requires the assent of two-thirds of the states to ratify any proposed changes to the
constitution. See Sanford Levinson, RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 110–134 (1995). Finally, separable amendment thresholds can be
used to identify areas of the constitution subject to higher barriers to amendment, up to and including
making certain aspects of the constitution unamendable altogether. See Albert, supra note 14, at
247–51.
27
Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of Constitutional Change Between Reform and
Evolution, 39 J. FEDERALISM 213, 213 (2009).
28
For example, the comparative flexibility of constitutions has been linked to increases in
constitutional endurance. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, & James Melton, THE ENDURANCE
OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
29
However, the nature of constitutional jurisprudence provides an additional outlet by which
constitutional change can occur: instead of amending the constitution, changing judicial
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offs, constitutional scholars have focused on identifiable effects from different
amendment procedures,30 in addition to the rate of change that more or fewer
barriers to amendment imply.31
A broader characterization of the institutional design trade-offs implicit to
the choice of amendment rules surrounds the need for a constitution to adapt to new
developments while entrenching the system from self-interested behavior,32 at
some point, amendment rules that are too flexible would mean none of the rules of
the game are insulated from political pressures.33 The need for constitutional
change has also been linked to political change and the dysfunctional performance
of the existing constitutional regime.34 Each of these insights displays the fact that
amendment procedures (and the frequency of amendment the procedures create)
exist in a complex dynamic with the ongoing operation of the political system in
both prior and subsequent periods. This is no different in the case of blockchains—
the rules for changing the underlying fundamental rule set are implicated in
complex ways in the processes of governance and cryptocurrency output. In
particular, constituents of blockchains face low exit costs, which provides an
alternative to both enduring a rule set that is too rigid to change, as well as
weathering changes of a greater frequency and magnitude than they would prefer.35
interpretations of constitutional requirements can adjust the constitution to reflect changing social
conditions. See id.
30
One such trade-off focuses on the extent to which the constitution includes high levels of detail
as creating less need for downstream judicial interpretation. See Albert, supra note 14. Depending
on the rigidity of the amendment rule, judicial interpretation may achieve a high level of finality. In
the United States, for example, only four Supreme Court rulings had been reversed by constitutional
amendment by 1988. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
POLITICAL PROCESS 201 (Princeton University Press, 1988).
31
This insight has been developed empirically, for several scholars have linked the length and detail
of constitution to the frequency of amendment. See, e.g., Gabriel Negretto, Replacing and Amending
Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 Law & Soc’y Rev 749–79
(2012); Elkins et al., supra note 28.
32
See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1584–626 (2010).
33
A constitutional scholar who views constitutions as a bargain amongst powerful government
actors (e.g., a legislature and a monarch or executive, typically) equates strengthening amendment
rules with facilitating minority rights and the rule of law, emphasizing the role of stability as a
crucial input to the rule of law. See Roger D. Congleton, PERFECTING PARLIAMENT:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM, LIBERALISM, AND THE RISE OF WESTERN DEMOCRACY 287 (Cambridge
University Press, 2010).
34
For example, the extent to which a given political system displays fragmentation of parties has
been shown to interact with the nature of amendment procedures and the frequency. Gabriel
Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin
America, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV (2012); see also Negretto, supra note 31, and Schofield, supra note
18.
35
Frequency of changes to a given blockchain network’s rule set is already a margin defining distinct
cryptocurrencies. Ethereum has changed its rules much more frequently than Bitcoin. See Primavera
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Furthermore, an important distinction exists in the literature between
amending the constitution and amending the amendment procedures contained
therein. A stable amendment procedure is a key measure of constitutional
durability.36 Changes to the constitution are expected, but changes to the means by
which the constitution can be changed signal a very different kind of change. This
is related to the fact that amended rules have been characterized as directly
expressing fundamental constitutional values.37 Similarly, amendment processes
themselves can be understood as having a revelatory function, whereby the basis
for the legitimacy of governance is revealed through both proposed and successful
constitutional amendments.38 Changing the means of amendment is thus more of a
meta-amendment, as compared to the more common changes to the underlying
structure, and may indicate that such a change implicates much more fundamental
changes to governance than other amendments.39 Different changes to
cryptocurrency blockchains can be understood as implicating these concerns to
very different degrees, as the discussion in section V emphasizes—some changes
to blockchains are the equivalent of ordinary amendments, whereas others are the
equivalent of changing amendment rules themselves.
Constitutional design writ large is seen as a trade-off between the
economies of scale in governance that a single fundamental rule set creates and the
agency costs associated with the necessarily representative government that
governance at such a scale entails. 40 One of the fundamental challenges in
constitutional design is to restrain the lawmaking power once this power has been
vested in representative agents who are only periodically and at best imperfectly
disciplined by the constituents whose governance preferences their choices ideally
represent.41 Of course, there is a dynamic element to these design choices, which
implies that the fundamental ruleset should, to the extent possible, minimize future
transaction costs associated with governance to reduce the need for costly
constitutional change.42 The study of constitutions for the design of fundamental
de Filippi & Aaron Wright, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 188 (Harvard
University Press, 2018).
36
Rasch & Congleton, supra note 8.
37
See Albert, supra note 14.
38
Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 5–47 (2009).
39
Not all changes to amendment procedures are necessarily so fundamental; Sweden’s changes to
its amendment procedures were a necessary consequence of reducing the number of chambers of
the legislature, as opposed to being directly intended to significantly change the way the constitution
could be changed in the future. See Congleton, supra note 33.
40
Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 32, at 1594–97.
41
Fʀɪᴇᴅʀɪᴄʜ A. Hᴀʏᴇᴋ, Tʜᴇ Cᴏɴꜱᴛɪᴛᴜᴛɪᴏɴ ᴏꜰ Lɪʙᴇʀᴛʏ, 183–88 (1960).
42
Rɪʟᴇʏ, supra note 5, at 163–67.
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rule sets concludes that these sets of rules trade off between facilitating governance
at scale (as well as the underlying processes being governed)43 and creating
principal-agent problems on the part of those individuals who directly take part in
governance. In the case of permissionless blockchains, the network participants
who process and validate cryptocurrency transactions are the equivalent of
representative agents that are only constrained by the network rules and the choice
of users to transact and store value in one cryptocurrency or another. I explain this
analogy in detail in the following section.
III.

BLOCKCHAINS AND GOVERNANCE

Blockchains are, at their most fundamental, a ledger distributed across
numerous networked computers that share a known process for updating entries to
the shared ledger. The blockchains supporting most major cryptocurrencies share
two important definitional components: (i) changes to the underlying ledger update
original entries in discrete blocks of information,44 as opposed to overwriting them;
and (ii) these changes to the ledger occur via a decentralized process among
participants on a particular blockchain network.45 The way in which decentralized
updates to the common ledger occur is defined by the consensus algorithm put in
place by a given blockchain. This consensus algorithm (the rules for determining
how changes to the ledger occur) is part of the initial conditions that are coded into
the architecture of the blockchain itself. In what is perhaps the most famous
blockchain—that underlying Bitcoin— the consensus algorithm creates a race

43

See Aʟꜱᴛᴏɴ et al., supra note 18, at 307–16, for a discussion of law (including constitutional law)
as a scalar mechanism facilitating social interactions and transactions.
44
A blockchain is literally a chain of blocks of information (or code) referencing earlier states in the
ledger duplicated across numerous network nodes. Luke Fortney, Blockchain Explained,
Iɴᴠᴇꜱᴛᴏᴘᴇᴅɪᴀ (updated Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blockchain.asp,
[https://perma.cc/GFV7-BKHG].
45
A common misconception is that all blockchains use decentralized “permissionless” governance.
In reality, many of the commercial applications already in use utilize permissioned blockchains,
where a central authority grants permission to certain network nodes to make specific alterations to
the underlying common ledger. Supply chain innovations utilizing blockchain stand as a prominent
example of this. All blockchains are a form of distributed ledger duplicated across numerous
network nodes that can only be updated as opposed to amended, but only some blockchains are
permissionless. See Rainer Böhme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology, and Governance, 29(2)
J. Econ. Persp. 213, 213–38 (2015) for a discussion of blockchain’s definitional properties; see also
Kᴇᴠɪɴ Wᴇʀʙᴀᴄʜ, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST, 58–63 (2018).
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among network nodes (“participants”)46 to solve a cryptographic hash function,47 a
method that, while largely secure against fraudulent attempts to update the ledger
to reflect Bitcoins that do not exist,48 is graphics processor-intensive and so
consumes considerable amounts of energy.49 This particular consensus algorithm,
known as proof-of-work (“PoW”), operates in a winner-take-all fashion—when one
network participant has successfully solved the cryptographic puzzle, the rest of the
nodes that were processing potential solutions to the hash function are effectively
back to square one. From the perspective of these miners, the energy expended in
processing network users’ transactions receives no reward until the next set of
proposed changes to the Bitcoin ledger is accepted through the next successful
participant’s resolution of the hash function.50 Because each network participant’s
processor is engaged in an electrically costly race to solve the cryptographic puzzle,
this method of achieving consensus over proposed changes to the network ledger
is called “proof-of-work;” a successfully proposed block represents proof of energy
expended to validate network transactions. To the layperson, this means processing
transactions on the Bitcoin network is very electricity-intensive, and only more so
as the value of Bitcoin increases and more participants compete to receive a fixed

46

Network nodes are often referred to as miners because their incentives to process transactions are
created by a reward of new units of the cryptocurrency. Throughout this piece I will refer to the
individuals in control of these nodes as network participants, because of their role in the production,
processing, and verifying of cryptocurrency transactions. Individuals who use cryptocurrency to
transact or store value are instead network users, because they play no direct role in the maintenance
of the network (unless they are also a network participant).
47
A cryptographic hash function is basically a puzzle where network participants race to guess an
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unlikely. See, e.g., Wᴇʀʙᴀᴄʜ, supra note 45, at 100. Less widely adopted cryptocurrencies (with
accordingly lower numbers of network nodes) have suffered from 51 percent attacks, however. See
Jordan French, Ethereum Classic’s “51% Attack,” $1 Million Loss, Raise Concerns About Security,
THE STREET (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/bitcoin/attack-against-ethereumclassic-14832327 [https://perma.cc/H2ME-75NQ].
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See generally Arvind Narayanan et. al., Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies: a
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Blockchains, 28 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 1–9 (2017).
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amount of Bitcoins for each successful resolution of the hash function.51 Because
anyone who has a sufficiently powerful computer, internet access, and electricity
can become a network participant, this makes these types of blockchains
permissionless, meaning no central authority controls who can make changes to the
network ledger or participate in network governance.
What the choice of the PoW consensus algorithm has done for Bitcoin is to
drive a wedge between its initially proposed dual functions as a store of value and
a payment network. Bitcoin’s growing salience to potential adopters has made it an
increasingly successful store of value (with the exception of the price volatility52
associated with speculative interest and regulatory interventions in a variety of
countries), but this increase in value has created problems for Bitcoin’s ability to
serve as a competitive payment network, given the cost and time required to process
a single transaction. This has led to considerable debate within the Bitcoin
community itself surrounding how to overcome these problems that are a direct
result of the initial choice of consensus algorithm.53 In the case of Bitcoin, changes
to the rules governing the blockchain network’s processes occur through a fork in
the blockchain itself,54 which is successful if a majority of other network nodes
accept the new code as changed, as compared to the original code.55 This has led to
difficulties in successfully changing the underlying architecture of the network.
While this is not to say a given proposed fork in the Bitcoin blockchain should or
should not have occurred, a wide variety of network participants have expressed
frustration at the current means of changing the rules of the blockchain itself, which
emphasizes the importance of blockchain governance.
The process described regarding the simultaneous processing and validation
of a set of network transactions, coupled with the reward of new units of
51
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cryptocurrency for doing so, creates a set of margins that together define the
incentives of network participants. The margins of cryptocurrency reward amount,
network fees,56 block size, and puzzle difficulty together to create an equilibrium
expected payoff as a function of the energy expended by a given network
participant to successfully resolve a set of proposed transactions on the network.57
The greater the anticipated reward (increasing as puzzle difficulty decreases and
rewards and fees increase), the greater the number of network participants likely to
expend the energy in racing to solve the underlying hash function. Thus, one
significant area of debate among network participants is how to calibrate these
factors to the benefit of all participants. Of course, the nature of processing
transactions is energy-intensive, which means energy prices greatly determine
where network participants are physically located,58 as well as these participants’
relative positions with respect to proposed changes to the rules governing the
blockchain. Importantly, though, a final definitional component of participants’
incentives is that of the costs of exit—to the extent that changes to their incentives
on one blockchain are sufficiently undesirable, permissionless blockchain
participants can (at some cost) opt into a different cryptocurrency blockchain that
better matches their governance preferences.
This all suggests that even in the case of cryptocurrency networks, for which
some of the comparative benefits depend in great part on the blockchain’s
immutability, the governance of system-wide processes (often tightly tied to the
consensus algorithm by which changes to the ledger occur) and the process by
which the rules of this governance can change, have significant implications for the
intended outputs of the network itself. Put differently, the rules about making or
changing rules governing a blockchain matter fundamentally. This insight comes
as no surprise to any legal or constitutional theorist, of course. In addition to the
Bitcoin community, other cryptocurrency blockchains (e.g., Ethereum) are
confronting similar problems in scaling informational changes on the network and
are instead proceeding with a different set of proposed changes, with the intent of
changing the underlying consensus algorithm itself. Ethereum has emerged as a
competitor to Bitcoin among major cryptocurrencies and is currently testing a
56

In addition to the rewards of new cryptocurrency units, network participants receive a set fee for
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See Paul Roberts, This Is What Happens When Bitcoin Miners Take Over Your Town, POLITICO
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different process by which rules as fundamental as the underlying consensus
algorithm are changed. This provides a clear example by which dominant
cryptocurrencies are currently competing in terms of governance—a phenomenon
discussed in detail in sections V and VI.
This concern over governance is unique to permissionless blockchains. In
the case of a central authority tightly defining the location or powers of a particular
network node, the means by which rule changes occur are not necessarily related
to the network nodes’ roles or preferences in any way and instead are a function of
ordinary centralized firm decision-making.59 In contrast, the design of
permissionless blockchains means anyone with the right hardware, internet access,
and reliable electricity can become a participant and hence have incentives and
beliefs about the appropriate scope and form of blockchain governance.
Decentralized validation of network processes coupled with distributed
maintenance of the underlying ledger means that network participants necessarily
have direct influence over the continuance or change of the ruleset governing all
network processes.60 This implicates an aspect of governance typically reserved to
public organizations, where constituents cannot opt out of the processes to which
they are subject. Arguably, participants on a given blockchain are facing much
lower exit costs in terms of their preferred governance than an employee subject to
the centralized policies determined by private firm leadership. Their decision is
more akin to investors who choose to move money from one firm to another based
upon the governance decisions made by the firms in question. Nonetheless, on
permissionless blockchains, the validation of network transactions is designed to
prevent participants from evading the universal rules. This makes a similar
influence over input to the ruleset incentive compatible. Unlike traditional firms,
the equivalent of shareholders in a given permissionless blockchain are also
engaged in the output of that blockchain. This stands as a powerful departure from
traditional models of private governance.61
Similarly, blockchain network participants, and to a lesser extent, users, also
have strong beliefs about the appropriate scope and form of the functions to which
a given blockchain will be applied. Thus, certain proposals to alter the fundamental
rule set underlying a given blockchain are frequently argued to be at odds with the
“constitutional” principles that guided the definition of the blockchain in the first
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place.62 Originalist arguments have appeared in the context of proposed changes to
the Bitcoin blockchain, and in the case of Ethereum, one of the founders plays a
major role in ongoing debates about changes to the underlying blockchain.63
Debates surrounding the intent for Bitcoin to become a major store of value and
payment network, as compared to the intent for the currency to be immutable in
terms of the rules governing its creation and transfer, are fundamentally debates
about the true constitutional spirit of the blockchain as expressed through the
specific rules governing network processes.
A.

Blockchains and Constitutions

How, then, can blockchains be understood as a system of governance
analogous to that created by a constitution? The participants, or network nodes, in
a given blockchain play the role of the government, whereas the users of a given
blockchain can be seen as constituents. While network participants are not
representative agents in the exact sense politicians are, they are performing
governance functions on behalf of users who request transactions or store value on
the cryptocurrency blockchain. The fundamental rules of the blockchain create a
form of agency control by constraining the participants in the interest of the users,
which creates an equilibrium that operates to the benefit of the constrained
participants. Changes to cryptocurrency blockchains can thus affect any of the
following: (i) the core definition of the underlying unit of value; (ii) the process of
transactional validation by network participants; (iii) the incentives of network
participants (often implicated by changes to transactional processes); or (iv) the
comparative ability of a given blockchain to achieve its network objectives in
comparison to the ability of competing blockchains to do so.
An important distinction between blockchain governance and modern
constitutional democracies lies in the absolute lack of separation of powers.
Blockchain participants exercise executive, legislative, and judicial functions
simultaneously. As participants successfully solve the cryptographic hash function
underlying the proof of work algorithm, they are simultaneously processing
network transactions and generating network resources (the underlying
62
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cryptocurrency), while other participants mechanically validate proposed
transactions’ conformity with underlying network rules.64 Each of these processes
can be likened to a distinct role of government. Cryptocurrency production and the
proposal of minor rule changes, together, are the equivalent of legislation.
Processing transactions of existing cryptocurrency is like the execution of law.
Ensuring conformity with network rules is akin to the judicial function of finally
determining violations of the law by constituents.65 Currently, the incentives to
perform these functions are linked to the production function; miners engage in
costly processing of transactions due to the anticipated reward for successfully
solving the underlying cryptographic hash function that accompanies their doing
so.
Blockchains, unlike government processes and judicial review, do not allow
for the informal remedies for adjustments to the rule structure to better fit the needs
and aims of those governed by the ruleset. Granted, blockchain participants can
adjust their uses of the blockchain to some limited extent, but they cannot directly
interpret the underlying fundamental rule structure like government and judicial
actors can in terms of constitutional implementation and interpretation. Put
differently, the extent of discretion afforded to the government to make the Civil
Rights Act a reality, or the extent of judicial interpretation that the Bill of Rights
has required (and will continue to require), far exceeds the scope of choice
blockchain network participants have in terms of the scope, form, and frequency of
transactions to undertake. Coherence and supremacy are practically guaranteed in
blockchain processes, which can be a double-edged sword when it comes to
punishing bad-faith actors on the network, as the subsequent discussion about the
DAO hack on the Ethereum blockchain emphasizes. Reversing a bad action under
current governance processes takes the equivalent of a constitutional amendment.
One of the most important distinctions between changes to blockchains and
constitutional amendment processes surrounds the notion of forking the chain of
code. Three distinct, predominant means66 of forking exist: (i) a soft fork, which
results in compatibility for network nodes that have not yet adopted the new rule
change; (ii) a hard fork that would result in network nodes that have not accepted
64
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the new rule change rejecting blocks created under the new rule set; and (iii) hard
forks that result in two permanently separate versions of the underlying blockchain,
one under the old ruleset and one under the new ruleset.67 Major rule changes,
including updates to the block size, result in hard forks, which create the possibility
for deterioration in network processes and outright errors, and as such, involve
considerable debate in a given blockchain community prior to their adoption. In the
second case of hard forks, unlike constitutional amendment, two blockchains can
exist where there once was one, and participants and users subsequently decide
(through their support of network processes and choice of transactional medium)
which chain to support.68 These choices in rule updates each influence the exit costs
facing participants and users if they do not like a particular rule change.69 With both
soft and hard forks that do not result in a new cryptocurrency, the participants and
users can only exit from the underlying blockchain entirely, as opposed to
continuing their participation and use on the chain of the forked cryptocurrency that
they most prefer. The choice of whether or not a hard fork will result in a viable
second chain (and associated currency) is clearly utilized in cryptocurrency
communities, with an announced hard fork of Ethereum (Constantinople) that will
not result in a viable second chain, accompanied by discussion as to whether a
second chain would emerge.70 Such an outcome depends on the extent to which
participants accept or reject the proposed rule changes, as well as the specific
changes to the protocol layer itself that the proposed update makes.
In contrast, after a constitutional amendment, constituents are uniformly
governed by the altered constitution, and the old constitution only governs those
legal claims that emanated when the prior version of the constitution was in force.
This means fundamental changes in rule sets on blockchains are subject to
competitive pressures after the fact, with the former rule set potentially remaining
a viable transaction and currency network, which allows for subsequent revelation
of the perceived value of the network change. This distinction means blockchains
are subject to competitive pressures on a number of margins which constitutional
governance is not, notwithstanding the limited ability of constituents to move from
67
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one constitutional regime to another (to the extent they can afford to do so). This
also means that in cases where a cryptocurrency forks to reflect distinct governance
preferences on the part of different groups of network participants, this operates as
a low-cost form of exit—both groups can be governed by their preferred set of
constitutional rules, although they can no longer transact with one another on the
same blockchain as before.71 All of this implies that the choice to fork presents an
important strategic margin for blockchain network participants considering rule
changes.72
The scope of activities governed by a blockchain is much smaller than those
defined by the legislative process in modern constitutional orders; the former is
limited to a small number of processes, whereas the latter is only cabined by the
boundaries the constitution places on the action of the government. This variance
in “legislative” scope has a corollary implication: the comparative importance of
the judicial function increases as legislative scope increases. If a governance regime
has a known and limited set of functions, the interpretation of the conformity of
these functions with underlying network rules is a relatively simple process.
However, as the nature and interpretability of network functions increases, the
challenge, and hence, systemic importance of ensuring that these functions are in
accordance with underlying rules similarly increases. This results in a comparative
certainty of application of blockchain rules, as compared to constitutional rules;
although, to the extent that blockchains follow through with proposed changes to
include decentralized transactional processing and validation, this is likely to create
unique challenges, as discussed in the section treating the Lightning Network and
Sharding below. This means the implementation of changes to the underlying
blockchain rules is much more certain. Blockchain rule changes have less need for
interpretation in subsequent periods but are also less subject to downstream political
pressures than constitutions, which require executive discretion in their
implementation, coupled with judicial interpretation to oversee the constitutionality
of this implementation.
Unlike constitutional government at the national level, those governed by a
particular blockchain face much lower exit costs and can also be simultaneously
governed by several blockchains to the extent they mine or transact in more than
one cryptocurrency.73 This provides an interesting analog to the decentralized

71

Narayanan et al., supra note 49, at 171–73.
Alastair Berg, Chris Berg & Mikayla Novak, Blockchains and Constitutional Catallaxy, (Dec. 4,
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3295477.
73
Cowen, supra note 61.
72

152

Constitutions and Blockchains: Competitive Governance of Fundamental Rule
Sets

governance arrangements studied in a number of contexts.74 Consider the extent to
which blockchain participants and users can freely enter and exit the governance
arrangements of a given cryptocurrency, and compare it to the proposed and
existing real-world governance schemes intended to harness similar governance
benefits as a function of the largely voluntary presence of their constituents; there
is significant overlap between the two.75 The comparatively low-cost exit option
both disciplines blockchain network participants in their choices of rule changes
and serves as a margin of competition when rule changes implicate exit costs
directly, as the discussion in section VI emphasizes.
The means by which constitutional amendment can proceed in ordinary
political systems provide a blueprint by which to consider similarly fundamental
governance changes on permissionless blockchains. Ultimately, the certainty of the
application of blockchain network rules and the comparatively low exit costs facing
cryptocurrency users reduce the importance of ex-post constitutional interpretation
as amending the ruleset itself. For example, in the case of judicial review, there is
no clear analogy because of the decentralized fashion in which network transactions
are validated; absent an ex-ante agreement among over half of network participants,
a given network node (run by a network participant) could not use its own discretion
to validate transactions at odds with the rules of the blockchain.76 The next informal
means of constitutional change is that of adjustments in government processes and
norms; in the case of blockchains, this involves participants and users’
understanding of network capabilities and limitations, and their ability to adjust
their network uses accordingly. One example of this would be users limiting their
transactions on the Bitcoin network to a certain minimal threshold, below which
the network fees for doing so do not make economic sense. Next, it is possible in
theory to develop subsidiary layers of code governed by distinct rule sets (or simply
rules that do not need to be validated by the entire network); in each case, these
would operate like political and administrative decentralization, respectively. In the
case of distinct rule sets, different network nodes (or a set of nodes) would operate
their own rules or processes, although this would create coordination costs in
reconciling different underlying processes with the primary chain itself; this is
74
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something the Ethereum blockchain may be better suited to facilitating, given its
focus on more complex transactional processes. 77 In the case of the same rules, a
subset of network nodes would be responsible for processing and validating
network processes without wholesale validation occurring across the entire
network. Importantly, in order for these decentralized processes to occur, this
would require the support of a sufficient majority of network participants—
blockchain’s equivalent of a constitutional amendment. Finally, in the most wellknown process (given the debates surrounding formal changes to the network
rules), if a sufficient number of network nodes adopt a proposed rule change or
changes, then the primary blockchain will be governed by these rules accordingly
(with those set of network nodes that rejected the rule change operating under the
old set of rules if a specific type of hard fork occurs).78
Accordingly, when it comes to governance, permissionless blockchain
participants have three alternatives when it comes to adjusting governance. They
can amend the rules underlying the blockchain itself (including those such as
forking, which greatly shape exit costs), they can develop subsidiary governance
processes that prevent the need for adaptation of the main blockchain, or they can
adjust their use of a given blockchain, either directly, or by choosing to exit
altogether and participate in or use another blockchain whose governance better
resolves that participant’s fundamental aims.
B.

Cryptocurrency Governance Debates

Governance debates in cryptocurrency communities have resulted in a
number of proposed and realized solutions that contain direct parallels to
constitutional design choices intended to reduce agency costs while simultaneously
capturing scale economies in governance. These debates have implicated
fundamental beliefs as to the most important governance principles that should be
realized in the rule sets of a given cryptocurrency blockchain, as in the case of
Ethereum and Ethereum Classic. Smaller changes to these blockchains (like block
size) have nonetheless resulted in sufficient disagreement to where distinct
governance regimes have emerged, such as the hard fork between Bitcoin and
Bitcoin Cash. Different forms of subsidiary governance solutions have emerged as
proposals, including both administrative and judicial decentralization, as well as
elements of relational contracting, in the cases of the Bitcoin Lightning Network
and the proposed Ethereum changes of Plasma and sharding. Wholesale change to
governance processes is also being explored in the case of Ethereum’s proposal to
transition their blockchain from a proof-of-work consensus method to a proof-of77
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stake algorithm, in what would be the closest case to amending amendment rules
themselves. Finally, new entrants have explicitly conditioned their competitive
advantage on choices of blockchain governance, suggesting that permissionless
blockchains will continue to be an important locus of innovation in private
governance as participants and users exit from blockchains whose governance
choices are less representative than others.
1.

Ethereum and Ethereum Classic

In 2016, the Ethereum community was split between two governance
alternatives in response to a well-publicized hack resulting in the loss of nearly $50
million of Ether. The Ethereum community had developed an organization for
signaling community confidence in proposed applications (decentralized apps or
dApps) for use on the Ethereum blockchain. The Decentralized Autonomous
Organization (DAO)—effectively a complex smart contract running on the
Ethereum blockchain—was intended to serve as a means of funding different
proposed applications using the decentralized input of individual users. Following
a screening process accomplished via known network figureheads, users who had
bought tokens in the DAO could then, in theory, allocate these tokens to projects,
and once projects had reached a 20 percent token threshold for acceptance, they
would be funded via the Ether held by the DAO.79 Taken at face value, the DAO
presented a governance innovation in that the investment decisions would have
involved human decision-making by screening projects ex-ante through existing
reputation, social capital, and authority within the community. This presented the
direct possibility that smart contracts can still involve elements of relational
contracting.
However, a flaw in the code intended to prevent “bank runs” (which
required Ether withdrawn from the DAO in response to approved applications to
be held for 28 days), enabled hackers to capture $50 million of Ether.80 This flaw
in the code resulted in a major governance challenge for network users. Maintaining
fidelity to what were argued to be core principles governing the blockchain meant
allowing the hackers to get away with $50 million. If instead, the blockchain could
be dialed back to the state immediately preceding the hack, then those who
benefited from the coins that were withdrawn from the DAO would never have
79
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received their tokens. This latter option violated what many network participants
saw as hard principles governing the creation and transfer of Ether on the Ethereum
blockchain — transfers of Ether, once completed according to network rules, were
immutable and given that the blockchain had already updated in light of the funds
transferred out of the DAO. These funds going to the individual (or individuals)
who exploited the flaw in the DAO code was a scenario seen as preferable to going
against accepted rules governing the transfer of Ether on the Ethereum
blockchain.81 What came into conflict here was the extent to which participants
believed faithfulness to the immutability of network processes should take
precedence over punishing clearly wrongful activity — essentially a conflict of
constitutional beliefs. As of July 20th, 2020, Ethereum’s market capitalization of
$26.3 billion was over thirty-five times that of Ethereum Classic.82 This suggests
that more network participants and users believed in the importance of punishing
bad actors, especially when it came to convincing new cryptocurrency adoptees that
subsidiary systems on the Ethereum network had the willingness and the ability to
punish bad actors who exploit weaknesses in code.
2.

Bitcoin v. Bitcoin Cash

One strain the existing Bitcoin blockchain has put on network participants
and users is the ability to process payments in a timely fashion. The block size of
the Bitcoin blockchain, along with the difficulty of the hash function miners are
solving, effectively determines the number of transactions the network can process
in a given time period. Transactions per second is the common measure among
major payment networks like Visa, with the Visa network averaging 1,700
transactions per second (and an underlying capacity of 47,000 transactions per
second).83 In contrast, the Bitcoin network can process roughly seven transactions
per second.84 More problematically, as the number of users of Bitcoin increases,
this number of transactions remains the same because of the fixed size of blocks of
data that are added to the Bitcoin blockchain and the largely fixed-rate at which the
hash function is solved. Put differently, more network participants have to get in
line for a process that only serves one customer at a time and that takes roughly the
81
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same time to conclude each time. Thus, the more people transacting in Bitcoin, the
greater the delay each transacting party faces before their transaction can conclude.
The implications are clear when it comes to Bitcoin’s ability to be a payment
network that can effectively serve a greater number of users. As a result, one hard
fork resulted in a distinct cryptocurrency called Bitcoin Cash. Bitcoin Cash uses
similar network processes to those supporting Bitcoin but involves a larger block
size, thus allowing for greater transactional speed. As of July 20th, 2020, Bitcoin
Cash’s market capitalization stood at $4.1 billion, while that of Bitcoin stood at
over forty times greater, at nearly $170 billion.85 Notwithstanding the large
disparity in valuation, Bitcoin Cash is currently the fifth largest cryptocurrency by
market capitalization, which suggests a large number of participants and users saw
considerable value in the underlying network changes. However, the nature of
comparative market capitalizations poses the question of the extent to which
competition among closely related blockchains will result in multiple viable
currencies. A given currency’s value as a medium of exchange depends on
widespread adoption, which creates a clear long-term downside to multiple closely
related currencies. Can they compete as effectively as entirely distinct
cryptocurrencies whose brand could more clearly signal underlying distinctions in
blockchain governance choices? Forking as a means of reducing exit costs for
network participants is not without its own costs to the network and may not always
be a desirable option.
3.

Lightning Network (BTC) & Plasma/Sharding (ETH)

Interestingly, both Bitcoin and Ethereum participants have begun to explore
solutions from the realm of relational contracting and decentralized governance in
order to overcome the problem of scale created by the proof-of-work algorithm
underlying each blockchain. In the case of the Bitcoin blockchain, a proposed
modification would effectively create a subsidiary network for handling
transactions among network users who repeatedly transact with one another. This
proposal, known as the Lightning Network, is in response to the same underlying
problem that led to the fork between Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash. The Lightning
Network is a proposal to move transactions off-chain by relying on existing
relationships among Bitcoin users. This would create a payment channel between
users, effectively allowing a limitless number of transactions between two parties
that have a payment channel between them. Once the parties have closed the
channel, the resulting net balance between the two would be posted to the Bitcoin
blockchain in a single transaction, significantly reducing the network load among
85

Trillo, supra note 83.

157

Constitutions and Blockchains: Competitive Governance of Fundamental Rule
Sets

users that repeatedly transact with and (likely) know one another. The proposal also
envisions numerous channels open among multiple users, intended to create a web
effect in which many transactions could occur off-chain, requiring only a few
transactions to finally post to the blockchain.86 Existing constraints have meant that
microtransactions in Bitcoin were impractical, given the long wait times and
network fees that could outstrip the value of the transaction. This led to third parties
willing to intermediate microtransactions, but the existence of such intermediaries
stands in contrast to the founding principles of a decentralized payment system
intended to fundamentally disintermediate transactions. By instead relying on the
existing repeated relationships among Bitcoin network users, this proposed change
leverages the power of relational contracting to overcome the problem of scalability
created by the fundamental underlying ruleset.
Given the similarities between the underlying blockchains’ protocols
supporting Bitcoin and Ether, Ethereum participants have also developed an
analogous solution, making the validation of smart contracts occur on a sublayer, a
proposed update to network rules called Plasma. Plasma is similar to the Lightning
Network, except it involves the validation of contracts as opposed to the validation
of transactions among repeat players. In each case, only a small proportion of the
activity on the subsidiary layer appears on and is validated by the network
governing the primary blockchain.87 Importantly though, this does not involve the
uniform enforcement of formally encoded blockchain rules to be operative on the
blockchain sublayer, unlike sharding, which will be discussed next. Thus, this form
of governance solution is most akin to administrative or political decentralization,
where a subset of participants wholly govern subsidiary processes with a new set
of rules that they themselves define.
Another related governance solution explored by Ethereum participants is
called sharding and is incorporated into recent proposals made by Ethereum
founder Vitalik Buterin. These proposals address the amount of policy adaptation
likely to take place on the second layer of protocol, as opposed to the primary layer
of the Ethereum blockchain itself.88 The proposed change is similar to classic
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governance solutions intended to overcome problems created by the increase in the
scale of processes, whether it be from the scope of government policies, the number
of people governed by them, or both. Sharding involves the replication of some or
all Ethereum blockchain processes in a subsidiary blockchain managed by one or
more network participants.89 The Ethereum logo is a crystal, which clarifies the
governance design underlying sharding. Each fragment of a larger crystal, known
as a shard, duplicates the internal molecular crystalline structure of the larger
crystal. In practice, sharding is a blockchain-specific form of judicial
decentralization, where the validation of network transactions occurs on only a
subset of participants’ nodes. Where this process stands as a potentially unique
governance innovation is that judicial decentralization is typically a function of
political decentralization, where subnational governments define law that is
subsequently adjudicated at the same level; here the blockchain rules would remain
the same, but only a subset of network participants would be responsible for
ensuring conformity with those rules.90 A fundamental trade-off of decentralization
is squarely apparent in the case of sharding. Increases in terms of the scalability of
network processes are weighed against the additional costs of governance on each
individual shard, as well as the coordination costs of reconciling individual shard
states with respect to the primary layer blockchain. The ability to maintain a greater
number of transactions with greater variance in applicable rules can be seen as a
governance solution designed to reduce the incentives to exit the blockchain due to
the greater likelihood that a given user and participants’ governance preferences
will be accommodated in the more relational or decentralized arrangements
intended to result.
4.

Proof-of-Stake (ETH)

One of the most fundamental governance changes being debated among
cryptocurrency network participants surrounds transitioning Ethereum from a
proof-of-work (PoW) to a proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus algorithm. This proposed
change directly approaches the problem of electricity intensity and network
congestion leading to high transaction fees and slow processing time, two of the
major obstacles to any cryptocurrency network functioning at scale. For
commercial actors to readily adopt cryptocurrency payment methods, they need
Should Be Innovative in the Short Term but Less in the Long Term, Vɪᴛᴀʟɪᴋ Bᴜᴛᴇʀɪɴ's ᴡᴇʙsɪᴛᴇ (Aug.
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assurance that payments will process quickly and will not cost the vendor a
significant proportion of the underlying transaction. Perversely, buying a car with
a cryptocurrency may currently present fewer obstacles than buying a latte with a
given cryptocurrency.
Transitioning from PoW to PoS involves a wholesale change to the
algorithm that produces, changes, and validates cryptocurrency ledger states.
Instead of a race to solve a cryptographic hash function, network consensus about
proposed changes to the underlying ledger is achieved through Ether holders
staking a portion of their holdings to become a network validator. The intention
behind the design derives directly from the concept of increased exit costs creating
beneficial governance incentives; validators that have staked a significant amount
of valuable Ether are much more likely to have the continued stability and viability
of the network in mind when validating new proposed blocks. Successfully
proposed blocks will reward their relevant stakeholders not only in terms of new
Ether but also via the fees associated with the transactions contained in a given
block.91 The proposed intent is to run the new blockchain on a test network for a
certain period of time, which makes this a phased transition, with the network
eventually transitioning at a known rate to a blockchain exclusively supported by
PoS as opposed to PoW processes. Ethereum’s co-founder, Vitalik Buterin, is
clearly concerned about governance compatibilities created by the simultaneous
existence of different consensus algorithms, as some of his technical output
suggests. 92
The phased transition reflects the profound change in network processes
that changing the consensus algorithm would entail. Unlike adjusting the size of
blocks, transaction fees, and new currency rewards, or even creating a subsidiary
layer of governance, a change to the consensus algorithm is equivalent to changing
the amendment rules of a constitution. Thus, the debates surrounding the change
have been longer and more intense than debates over alterations in fees and hash
function difficulty. If Ethereum transitions entirely to a PoS protocol, then all
fundamental rule alterations in the future will proceed via a completely different
governance process. Essentially, the new consensus mechanism is a proposal to
change the entire structure of government for the Ethereum blockchain, and as such,
stands as an amendment to the amendment processes themselves, if not a wholesale
constitutional overhaul. If successful, it will be worth observing closely how other
competing blockchains react to the benefits and costs revealed by a completely new
91
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system of blockchain governance, especially in the case of blockchains like Tezos
and EOS that have emerged in direct response to the governance tensions described
thus far. However, the magnitude of change and the implications for all the network
processes on the Ethereum blockchain have led to numerous missed deadlines
associated with the launch of this change, which was originally rumored to be
completed sometime in 2017.93 Given how central to the long-term viability of the
Ethereum network the PoS upgrade has been argued to be, it will be interesting to
see whether network participants choose to support the upgrade, create a second
currency based on the Ethereum blockchain up to that point (separate from
Ethereum Classic), or exit the system altogether.
5.

Emergent Governance Competitors: Tezos & EOS

This type of governance competition has already been occurring in the
realm of cryptocurrencies, though. When Tezos was released in 2017, its initial coin
offering (ICO) was one of the most successful to that point, raising $232 million.94
The amount raised in an ICO can be seen as a version of an initial public offering,
except governed by considerably less regulatory oversight. As investors have
crowded into the space, there has been considerable fraud in terms of the extent to
which companies issuing new coins actually have viable business models to support
the bet in their business model that a purchase of an ICO typically implies.95 In the
case of Tezos, the innovation surrounded blockchain governance processes
themselves, a direct competitive response to the strains facing the dominant
cryptocurrency blockchains supporting Bitcoin and Ether. Importantly, since the
emergence of Tezos, Ethereum proposals have converged on a similar governance
solution: that of PoS described above. Tezos allows for token holders to vote on
proposed changes to the network’s governance protocols—a node proposes a
change along with a price associated with the cost they require to implement the
change.96 In theory, this would allow for dynamic network pricing of governance
innovations. As importantly, the emergence of Tezos in response to existing
governance problems among the dominant cryptocurrencies in terms of scalability
displays competitive private governance in practice. However, it should be noted
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that Tezos has since faced profound governance issues in the real world, something
that has held up its deployment and resulted in numerous lawsuits against the
company.97 While network participants and users should pay close attention to the
governance changes being wrought on the networks in which they are invested, this
does not mean that choices regarding corporate structure and regulatory compliance
under public constitutional structures no longer matter.98 This lesson is often
forgotten amidst the exuberance that early cryptocurrency adopters have for radical
decentralization.
EOS is a more recently emergent competitor to the Ethereum and Bitcoin
blockchains. EOS, in direct response to the scalability issues that created the
governance challenges described thus far, is based upon a delegated proof-of-stake
system. Similar to Tezos, EOS was the most successful ICO of its time, raising
several billion dollars in support, although the exact number remains subject to the
volatility of Ether, the cryptocurrency in which the ICO was denominated.99
Interestingly, the founders have directly argued that this system is analogous to the
governance of a republic, where representative agents oversee the processing and
validation of network transactions.100 These agents are elected by the network
community, presumably with some form of punishment in subsequent electoral
rounds if their adherence to network rules and fundamental governance beliefs is
revealed to be lacking. Instead of staking the network’s currency, participants and
users vote on representative agents, with their number of votes being proportionally
equivalent to the size of their stake in the network.101 This method is designed to
overcome another fundamental governance challenge not unique to blockchains:
money in politics. In the case of Ethereum’s proposed changes, the requirement of
large Ether holdings in order to become a network validatory could in theory result
in these participants validating proposed blocks due to self-interest, as opposed to
those blocks’ conformity with the underlying ruleset of the network. By allowing
participants and users to aggregate their votes behind network participants that
97
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those individuals believe will process and validate transactions in good faith, EOS’s
consensus algorithm is designed to mitigate the scale advantage that large holdings
in the network are likely to create for certain Ethereum stakeholders.102 This is not
to argue to that EOS’ chosen governance mechanisms are superior, but instead to
emphasize how they serve as an example of governance innovations occurring as
blockchain networks distinguish themselves from one another on the institutional
margins defined in this article.
In this section, I have provided a variety of examples of the ways that
permissionless blockchains have already begun exploring institutional forms more
traditionally associated with public constitutional ordering. In the following
section, I explore additional constitutional design features that are likely to emerge
as a result of their nearly ubiquitous role in public constitutional ordering.
C.

Competitive Constitutional Governance on Blockchains

Despite the numerous differences between the comparatively narrow set of
network processes determined by a blockchain’s fundamental rule structure and the
broad range of human behavior governed by constitutions, those seeking to better
understand governance debates surrounding blockchains would do well to consider
the long history of constitutions.103 Debates about the fundamental principles of
governance inevitably implicate constitutional amendments, and the extent to
which a given governance structure can accommodate changes desired by a
sufficient number of constituents can directly determine how well that governance
structure can achieve its intended functions. In a competitive world, where network
users and participants bet on the viability of one blockchain over another,
governance provides an important margin for competition. This effectively
determines how well a blockchain can adapt to emergent network problems and the
changing demands of network users. In an important sense, blockchain users are
the ultimate sovereigns because the extent to which individuals choose to store
value and transact on a given blockchain determines the valuation of the
cryptocurrency. This, in turn, defines the incentives for network participants to
verify and process transactions. In this sense, network participants are constrained
by the changes to the network that their choices create; if the changes diverge
102
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sufficiently from network users’ intended purposes, these users can simply use the
network less or depart from it entirely.
Cryptocurrency blockchains provide a unique example of private
governance whose core characteristics overlap with a number of those typically
associated with public governance. 104 Unlike the traditional centralized hierarchy
of firm governance, all participants in the collective output of a given
cryptocurrency blockchain can influence the fundamental rules governing this
output. Nonetheless, these rules are subject to market choice by users in a way that
public governance at the nation-state level typically is not: cryptocurrency users
can readily vote with their feet. This means the blockchains supporting
cryptocurrencies are a unique case study in private governance,105 in which
unusually decentralized decisions surrounding fundamental rule sets are subject to
competitive market pressures facilitated by relatively low exit costs. These
blockchains thus mix governance features traditionally associated with public and
private organizations, respectively. Allowing for uniform and clearly regulated
input from all participants in the process as to the fundamental rule sets governing
them, while simultaneously subjecting this governance process to competitive
pressures, is a unique innovation in governance that should pique the interest of
institutional scholars and practitioners.
This infers that exit costs greatly define the incentives of individuals
choosing to make costly bets on network participation and use. In a context where
exit costs are relatively low, the stakes of any given group decision are necessarily
lower106 (provided, of course, that the group decision itself does not directly
implicate exit costs). For anyone who lives sufficiently close to the border of a state
rewriting its constitution, the downside risk associated with constitutional change
is lower. If the outcomes are sufficiently undesirable for any given individual who
faces low moving costs, that individual will likely choose to move rather than incur
the costs associated with the change in governance. In practice, though, even
moving a few miles across state lines poses a significant cost, especially as
compared to the cost of choosing to mine or transact in another cryptocurrency.
This simple fact of relatively low exit costs for cryptocurrency users and
participants has important implications for the dynamics likely to result from
constitutional level governance changes to a given blockchain. Interestingly,
though, exit costs are only one side of the ways in which networks can condition
membership – entry costs are another option, albeit one that has yet to be encoded
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into a cryptocurrency blockchain.107 As I have noted, though, Ethereum proposed
change to its consensus mechanism directly creates an entry cost for anyone seeking
to become a network validator.
One cause of these low exit costs is the nature of blockchain rule changes
themselves such as the possibility for a fork that reflects both opposing participants’
governance preferences on a given issue also lowers the stakes associated with a
given rule change. Whether or not a given set of cryptocurrency participants’
governance preference on an issue carries the day, if a fork in the blockchain
reflecting their preferences will persist after the rule change, this reduces the costs
of such change in governance to the “losers.” A second characteristic of
cryptocurrency communities also reduces the cost of governance changes to losers;
literal exit from participation or use of the cryptocurrency itself. Moving one’s stake
in a given cryptocurrency blockchain to another permissionless-blockchainsupported cryptocurrency, or into more traditional financial instruments altogether,
facilitates exit to a level never enjoyed by individuals who are subject to traditional
public constitutional governance.
Because exit costs directly influence the incentives of network participants,
these exit costs themselves create a potential margin for competition over
governance. Exit costs influence participants’ and users’ incentives both during
periods of ordinary network operation, as well as times when governance changes
are being wrought. Similar to a variety of investment contexts, the speed at which
one can convert a costly investment into a more liquid asset directly affects
individuals’ willingness to invest, and, accordingly, the return offered on the
investment.108 But the effects of exit costs are not limited to the individual
incentives of network users and participants. Because exit costs influence the
changes in governance that are likely to be realized, network participants have an
additional channel by which their incentives are implicated. Is a reduction in
network participants and the emergence of a competing but closely related
cryptocurrency worth the benefit of the more representative governance that is
likely to result in contexts where exit costs are lower? Participants must thus
examine how a rule change will affect both their own incentives and the exit
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decisions of other participants. They must also consider how comparatively better
or worse outcomes will then affect a similar calculus on the part of network users.
Lower exit costs thus facilitate greater competition in governance, which is
often argued to result in benefits associated with both enhanced government
accountability to citizens and experimental discovery.109 Lower exit costs also
suggest greater variance in policy change to the extent that constituents self-select
into the governance regime that most closely represents their preferences, as
opposed to using their input to moderate governance change in a regime in which
they are a minority.110 However, cryptocurrencies dependent on proof-of-work
algorithms need a sufficient number of miners to prevent attacks. These attacks
result when one set of network nodes controls more than fifty-one percent (51%)
of the computing power on the network. This means sufficient exit of miners carries
costs to the network writ large in ways that are similarly costly to users choosing to
stop transacting in the currency altogether. Because of this trade-off in terms of the
representativeness of governance, the sufficiency of network participation, and the
use to achieve its intended purposes, it is clear that lower exit costs are not
uniformly better.
In the context of Ethereum in particular, two things indicate attempts to
influence exit costs on the margins in ways that mean participants cannot as easily
choose to exit, whether to another Ethereum-based cryptocurrency or to another
cryptocurrency altogether: (i) the use of hard forks that do not result in two viable
chains111 and (ii) the intent to make certain types of computer processors less
profitable for network participants.112 Another important aspect of exit costs
surrounds the relationship between blockchain rule sets and the public legal systems
in which blockchain participants and users reside.113 EOS has a written constitution
that specifies, among other things, forums for dispute resolution among network
participants and users. This suggests that the choice of the public legal system as a
backdrop for on-chain disputes will prove an additional margin of competition.
Importantly, choosing to resolve a blockchain-related dispute before the courts is
another exit cost that different blockchain governance regimes will likely compete
on.
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Currently, though, the scope of the rules governing network processes on a
given permissionless blockchain is largely up for grabs by the same consensus
mechanism. This means that larger rule changes proceed with the same level of
consensus from network participants as more ordinary ones. Given the lessons from
constitutional design surrounding the necessarily expressive nature of defining and
changing a constitution, network participants are likely to increasingly consider
rule entrenchment as a design choice surrounding certain governance parameters.
The extreme of unamendability is baked into certain network design parameters
from the get-go, but otherwise making certain aspects of governance likewise
permanent is also an option that can provide a competitive governance margin for
blockchain network designers, as well as network participants in terms of updating
pre-existing governance choices.
In sum, there are a number of competing forces resulting from governance
choices that will greatly influence the number of viable cryptocurrencies: adoption,
competition, and exit costs for participants and users. The need for sufficient
adoption acts as a downward pressure on the number of cryptocurrencies; past a
certain point, too many cryptocurrencies with tiny user bases will prevent their
intended uses from being successful or will outright vitiate the benefits of
permissionless blockchains altogether by making a fifty-one percent (51%) attack
too easy. Competition between blockchains as a function of their outputs will
similarly reward and discipline blockchains whose governance choices on these
margins will determine their success and failure.114 Finally, the low costs of exit
both facilitate competitive pressures and present a direct governance design choice
on which cryptocurrency blockchains can compete. Do cryptocurrency users and
participants prefer the lower exit costs associated with forking the blockchain and
moving to other currencies, or can barriers to exit actually improve on-chain
governance outcomes?
These trade-offs can be understood by considering one example based on
the currently dominant cryptocurrencies’ governance structures. Rigidities in these
governance structures lend most of the benefits in terms of their use as currencies
but have revealed a hidden set of costs surrounding the inability of these currencies
to adapt to changing demands (to which some users would argue they should not
adapt). This implies a competitive benefit to more blockchains whose governance
models are slight to significantly different. In the long run, this should lead to more
efficient blockchain governance, but it implies a trade-off for the design of
blockchains themselves, as well as the market more broadly. Is a greater diversity
of blockchains more efficient, or are fewer, more flexible blockchains ideal? While
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flexibility has been linked to constitutional endurance, it is not as clear that the
mutability of network rules is the right competitive margin for blockchain
participants and users, especially as compared to exit costs. Blockchains’ value is
only realized after a sufficient number of users adopt the use of cryptocurrency that
a given blockchain supports. This suggests diminishing marginal returns to
numerical competition in governance; the benefits of competition in governance
between different blockchains cut against the benefits of scale that clearly exist in
blockchains more generally. This means the optimal level of flexibility in
blockchain governance can be seen as a function of the number of permissionless
blockchains out there in a particular industry. Past a certain point, this could cut
toward the need for fewer blockchains with more flexible governance mechanisms,
including exit costs calibrated to make one’s participation and use of a
cryptocurrency more or less “liquid.”
A related trade-off surrounds the current nature of governance change that
can fork the blockchain into two chains of code, which could be construed as
facilitating competitive governance processes, or as stymying them. Firm
governance is subject to competitive pressures. In theory, blockchain forks create a
possibility analogous to that of cloning a firm and subjecting it to two distinct
governance structures. However, in the case of a blockchain forking, it is not as if
a randomized controlled trial in governance is occurring with respect to a single
firm. Once a cryptocurrency has forked, the two new currencies are by and large
competitors.115 Furthermore, competition among cryptocurrencies is occurring on
a single originating blockchain, which creates an additional margin for competition.
Is a cryptocurrency’s ability to compete with other cryptocurrencies diminished
when it forks? Put differently, is its brand diluted when this occurs?116 A further
interesting possibility surrounds the ability of blockchain participants and users to
hold or divest the different currencies sometimes resulting from a hard fork.
Someone holding Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash could exchange all of their holdings in
one currency for holdings in the other as soon as these transactions could be
processed and validated after the fork occurred. This means prices of the distinct
cryptocurrencies subsequent to the fork can (at least in theory) reflect participants’
and users’ expected valuations of the underlying rule changes. This is only true to
the extent that blockchain participants and users are sufficiently and accurately
informed as to the underlying governance trade-offs described here, though.
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Thus, it should be noted that the arguments contained herein about network
participants’ and users’ input to governance depend upon awareness on the part of
these individuals of potential changes in governance and the costs and benefits
thereof. Accordingly, when considering blockchain governance changes, it is worth
asking how many blockchain users are sufficiently familiar with these debates to
be able to exercise a costly informed choice along the margins of governance
variation described thus far. In the case of network participants, incentives are wellaligned for them to be informed as to these trade-offs; participants’ input is required
at a high level for changes to occur, and the continued value of participants’ costly
investments in electricity and hardware depend significantly on the rules governing
the creation of additional cryptocurrency.117 In the case of users—those who simply
invest and transact in a given cryptocurrency—it is unclear just how well informed
they might be about the costs and benefits of proposed governance changes.
Nonetheless, because of their direct effect on the liquidity and value of
cryptocurrency investments, exit costs are arguably among those most likely to be
salient even to ordinary users of cryptocurrencies. If these costs increasingly
become a competitive margin, this suggests there may be increased variance in
governance in cryptocurrency blockchains, as one chain increases exit costs to
retain its existing user and participant base, and another keeps exit costs low at the
cost of losing a subset of its users and participants, at least in the short term.
Granted, notwithstanding some level of ignorance on the part of users and
participants as to the governance changes being debated, changes in the market
valuation of cryptocurrency often follow the success or failure of a given proposed
governance change. Nonetheless, given that network participants are by definition
users—at least for the period following their successful mining of a given amount
of the underlying cryptocurrency—their choices following successful and
unsuccessful governance changes are likely to inform price signals accordingly.
However, network participants account for only a fraction of network users.
Furthermore, cryptocurrency price shocks occur for a variety of reasons other than
governance changes, such as regulatory changes in countries with high levels of
crypto users, or frauds or hacks of major exchanges. This paper is therefore
intended to clearly spell out the economic and institutional trade-offs implicit in the
seemingly esoteric governance debates occurring among cryptocurrency network
participants.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

These debates over the best set of rules about making rules, or more typically,
constitutions, are not an understudied topic. But in the context of private
governance—where rule sets are typically more fluid, centrally controlled, and
exist in the shadow of law and regulation—developing generalizable insights about
comparatively superior governance mechanisms is more difficult. Permissionless
cryptocurrency blockchains provide a fruitful context within which to explore these
questions. These blockchain ecosystems can be understood as a type of
constitutional rule set that both defines and legitimizes the activities supported by
permissionless distributed ledger technology. The development of cryptocurrency
blockchains has thus led to new forms of competition in private governance, which
include exit costs as one of the fundamental margins upon which governance
outcomes will be shaped between blockchains. Although less salient in design
proposals currently, entry costs and rule entrenchment are also likely to play an
increasing role as different chains continue to tweak their governance choices in
light of the demands of network participants and users.
Constitutional and political theorists should therefore neither be baffled by
nor disinterested in the innovation currently occurring in governance processes on
permissionless blockchains. These processes share many similarities to
constitutional processes, and insights from constitutional design surrounding
implementation and amendment shed considerable light on current developments
in the communities supporting major cryptocurrency blockchains. The trade-off
between flexibility and rigidity has caused divides in these communities as they
debate how best to scale network processes while remaining true to the collectively
expressed understanding of the constitutional rule set of each blockchain. Some
changes to network processes that require the assent of a sufficient proportion of
network participants do not fundamentally alter the rules by which network
processes are governed. Instead, they affect the costs-and-benefits network
participants expect as a reward for facilitating network processes of currency
creation, validation of transactions, and participation in ongoing governance.
Changes to data block size, hash function difficulty, transaction fees, and reward
for hash function resolution all stand as examples of this type of constitutional
change on the blockchain. Other changes implicate more fundamental additions or
alterations to governance processes, such as the definition of subsidiary governance
or an overhaul of the entire process of governance change itself. While the Bitcoin
network’s most salient proposed changes have limited themselves to, at most,
creating a sublayer of governance, Ethereum’s proposed changes not only include
a related form of decentralized governance but also involve wholesale changes to
the means by which future changes to network processes will occur.
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The study of public and private governance is now ancient. Thus, while
blockchain processes present unique expressions of governance questions in new
contexts, it is not as if challenges in obtaining consensus surrounding a given
group’s processes and governance are new. This means that an understanding of
the fundamental trade-offs associated with constitutional design questions, with a
particular focus on amendment processes, could considerably benefit blockchain
designers and participants. Flexibility in amendment is seen as allowing necessary
adjustment absent which an entire constitutional order can be overturned.
Nonetheless, amendment thresholds should be sufficiently high that fundamental
rules are insulated from ordinary pressures. Constitutions are seen as trading off
between facilitating economies of scale in governance while simultaneously
creating agency problems among those individuals who provide direct input to
legislative, executive, and judicial governance. Decentralization is one solution that
allows for better representativeness while preventing a level of centralization that
obviates the ability to govern the number of processes demanded by a given
nation’s constituents. Thus, the relationship between blockchain participants and
users as a function of the processes governing them is clarified through
understanding the trade-offs that have long been debated in the context of
constitutional design and subsequent amendments.
Finally, decentralized processes similar to those of governance via executive,
legislative, and adjudicative functions may never have been automated at the
economic scale and complexity seen on permissionless cryptocurrency
blockchains. Blockchains can, therefore, be seen as an early example of
constitutional law as code.118 This means that competition among blockchains,
which results in unique governance solutions, could be a valuable and informative
precursor to the application of automated governance in the public sector. The terms
of blockchain network participation and use that define entry and exit will become
important margins of competition that shed light on the myriad institutional forms
of digital citizenship and exit that are likely to emerge across the 21st century. Of
course, it should be emphasized in conclusion that the benefits of this competition
are only attainable if there is sufficient informed adoption of cryptocurrencies to
where the competitive pressures described here yield efficiency-enhancing
governance benefits.
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